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Japan's View on Nuclear Weapons'
Mitsuru KUROSAWA"
Abstract
Entering into the 21st century, radical change of international environments has
some impact on Japan's view on nuclear weapons. In particular, the growing
threats from North Korea's nuclear missiles in the short term and from China's
military modernization in the longer term have influenced Japanese perception on
nuclear weapons. In addition, the nuclear non-proliferation regime is suffering
from erosion by the lack of universality and effectiveness of the NPT.
Since 2002, it is no longer a taboo to speak on a nuclear Japan, though it had
been a strong taboo for many years. In order to analyze Japan's view on nuclear
weapons, I will take up three questions on nuclear weapons. Should Japan have its
own nuclear weapons? Should Japan keep depending on the nuclear umbrella of
the U.S.? Should Japan keep pursuing nuclear disarmament? On each question,
I will first show the Government's official position, and then the opinions of both
proponents and opponents.
In addition, I will touch upon the Japan's frustration at the U.S. nuclear weapon
policies. One is the relationship between nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation, and the other is the criticism to recent U.S.-India agreement on
nuclear cooperation.
Keywords : nuclear weapons, NPT, nuclear non-proliferation,
nuclear disarmament, nuclear Japan, nuclear umbrella, U.S.-India
This is a revised and expanded version of a paper "Japan's View on Nuclear Weapons," which was
submitted to the U.S.-Japan Second Track Meeting on Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-proliferation
and Verification, organized by Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute of
International Studies (MIIS) and Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
(CPDNP), Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), held on March 7-8, 2006 in Washington, D.C.,
U.S.
Professor of International Law and Relations, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka
University, Japan.
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SHOULD JAPAN HAVE ITS OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS?1
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The Government's Position
The current Government position is clear as Prime Minister Koizumi stated in
June 2002 that his cabinet has never considered nuclear weapons and earnestly
abides by the three non-nuclear principles. The then Defense Minister Shigeru
Ishiba also stated."Even if North Korea has nuclear weapons, Japan will never go
nuclear, and Yukio Takeuchi, the then Administrative Vice-Minister of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs clearly denied the possibility of a nuclear Japan,
stating, "A nuclear Japan is not a realistic option for Japan. The administration
has never examined the issue.'-
Members of the Japanese Diet are also very sensitive to the issue of
nuclearization as reflected in recent survey data. For example, in a September 2003
questionnaire to all members of the Diet including Houses of Representatives and
Councilors, 1 percent said we should examine nuclearization soon, 6 percent said
we should examine it in the future, 19 percent said we may examine it according
to changes in domestic and international circumstances, and 68 percent said we
should never discuss it.2
Although it is no longer a taboo to discuss the probability of a nuclear Japan,
the current administration and the vast majority of the members of the Diet are
reluctant even to discuss this issue.
Proponents
Japan should develop independent nuclear forces
Regardless of U.S. approval, Japan should develop nuclear weapons not only to
counter the North Korean nuclear threat, but also to emerge from subordination
to the United States and become truly independent.
Japan should go nuclear under U.S. approval
Japan should go nuclear to counter the threat from North Korea, as the United
States will approve Japan's nuclearization. The vast majority of those who support
~　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
1) On a more precise analysis of the issue, see, Mitsuru Kurosawa, "Moving Beyond the Debate on
Nuclear Japan," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 11, No. 3, Fall/Winter 2004, pp. 110-137.
2 ) Mainichi Shimbun, September 28, 2003.
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the idea of Japan going nuclear presuppose that the United States will approve or
acquiesce to a nuclear Japan. These presuppositions are mainly based on the
statements by American experts, in particular those made by Vice-President
Cheney.
Professor Terumasa Nakanishi, an advocate of Japan's nuclearization even before
Cheneys statement, interprets his statement as an advertising balloon for Japan,
and a sign of containment -against North Korean nuclear development and Chinese
arms buildup. In the longeer term, he states, Japans nuclearization is in the U.S.
interest. Responding to the claim that Japan does not need nuclear weapons
because of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, he states that the option of relying on
extended deterrence can only be considered credible in a situation where there is a
perfectly bipolar confrontation, such as the structure during the Cold War. He
states that it would be hard for Japan to find any effective way of dealing with
the situation other than with nuclear arms of its own. Japan must not hesitate to
declare its intention of acquiring a nuclear capability if any of the following- three
situations becomes reality: i) a situation in which the U.S. commitment to Japan's
security clearly wavers; ii) a situation in which China develops a full-fledged naval
capability extending to the high seas and establishes a regular presence around
Okinawa and the Senkaku Islands; or iii) a situation in which the question of
North Korea's nuclear capability is allowed to remain ambiguous.3
Professor Satosm Morimoto, while arguing that we should respond to North
Korea's nuclear forces by development and deployment of missile defense and
guided precision weapons, asserts that as a last resort we should pursue British-
style nuclearization where the United States provides us with nuclear-capable
Polaris submarines. Such an arsenal would be used in the cases when we are under
serious nuclear threat from a neighboring country, but we can not completely
depend on nuclear deterrence under the Alliance, and the NPT and other
international undertakings do not ensure the survivability of Japan."
3 ) Terumasa Nakanishi, "Nihonkoku Kakubusoueno Ketsudan (Decision for a Nuclear Japan), Shokun! 35
(Aug朋t 2003), pp. 22-37. See the English translation, Terumasa Nakanishi, "Nuclear Weapons for Japan,
Japan Echo 30 (October 2003), pp. 48-54.
4 ) Satoshi Morimoto,旧ikokugata Last Resort Kakusenryakuno Susume (Pursue British-Style Last Resort
Nuclear Strategy), Shokun! 35 (August 2003), pp. 67-69.
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Japan should keep the nuclear opt乙on open
Japan should keep the nuclear option open. Although nuclear weapons are not
necessary now, we should never say that we will never have nuclear weapons.
Japan should introduce U.S. nuclear weapons
Japan should permit the introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons in order to
counter the North Korean nuclear threat, by dropping the third principle _of the
three non-nuclear principles.
Passive Opponents
The United States will never approve a nuclear Japan
The United States will never approve of nor acquiesce to Japanese development
and possession of nuclear weapons. In contrast to the above-mentioned opinions,
the majority of speakers on this issue believe that it is unthinkable for the United
States to allow a nuclear Japan.
Japan needs no nuclear weapons because of the U.S. nuclear umbrella
Japan does not need nuclear weapons as long as the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty
is healthy and nuclear deterrence is effective. Many experts have expressed
opinions, such as ''As long as the U.S.-Japan Alliance is functioning, Japan can
rely on nuclear reaction from the United States. As a result, a nuclear Japan will
become a realistic option only when the Alliance disappears," and "There is no
better option for Japan than to stay under the U.S. nuclear umbrella for nuclear
deterrence.
Nuclear weapons would be useless as a deterrent against North Korea
Japans nuclear forces would be useless because they will not function as a
deterrent against the threat from North Korea. If U.S. nuclear deterrence will not
work because the leadership in North Korea has a peculiar and irrational way of
thinking, then Japanese nuclear forces cannot either.
Japans nuclearization would be impossible from a military and strategic point of view
工t is impossible for Japan to develop and deploy nuclear weapons from a
military and strategic point of view because of Japan's geographical nature. Japan
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has its own geographical vulnerability that it can not absorb nuclear damage. As
Japan is surrounded by the sea it is difficult to assume the situation like m North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states where tactical nuclear arsenals are
supposed to intimidate massive conventional attacks.
Active Opponents
Japan's nuclearization would jeopardize the U.S.-Japan relationship
Japan's nuclearization would obstruct the friendly relationship between the
United States and Japan, and lead to the collapse of the Alliance. This would put
Japan on a confrontational track with the United States, and the result would be
harmful to Japan's security.
A nuclear Japan would endanger East Asian security
With regard to East Asian countries, a nuclear Japan would encourage a
Chinese nuclear build-up and probably lead to nuclearization by South Korea and
Taiwan as well. The result would be a reduction in Japanese security.
Japan's nuclearization would lead to the collapse of the NPT
Japan's nuclearization would have effects on the international nuclear
nonproliferation regime as well. A nuclear Japan would lead to a breakdown of
the regime and invite many states to have nuclear weapons. As a result, Japan's
security would decrease while Japan would suffer from particularly damaging
economic sanctions.
Japan's international standing would be put at risk by nuclearization
Japan's international standing would also be put at risk by nuclearization. If
Japan withdraws from the NPT and develops nuclear weapons, it would incur
intense criticism and isolation from the rest of the world. That result would run
counter to Japanese political and security interests.
Japan should not develop nuclear weapons because of their absolute immorality
Japan should not develop nuclear weapons because Japan is the only victim of
the nuclear holocaust and is the only nation that knows their disastrous effects.
Many in Japan still completely deny nuclear weapons from the viewpoint of their
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immorality based on the experiences in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Probability for Japan Going Nuclear
While some Japanese experts argue for a nuclear Japan, many experts are
rather negative about the likelihood Japan will go nuclear. They cite not only
passive reasons, such as that it is not necessary or useful, but also cite the active
reasons that nuclearization would detract from Japan-s security. Taking all
arguments above into consideration, the probability that Japan will develop a
nuclear arsenal seems to be extremely low for the foreseeable future. The
reasoning included in the opponents viewpoints is very convincing, and overall
analysis including traditional non-nuclear feelings among Japanese people, Japan's
national and security interests, Japan's position in the international community
and technical, military and strategic difficulties leads us to conclude that a nuclear
Japan is not likely.5
SHOULD JAPAN KEEP DEPENDING ON THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA OF
THE U.s.?
The Government's Position
Even after the end of the Cold War, uncertainty and unstable factors such as
regional conflicts due to complex and diverse causes, the proliferation of WMD and
missiles, still persist in the Asia-Pacific region. Since Japan is unable to respond
to all the situations that might threaten the country's security solely with its own
defense capabilities, Japan must uphold its security under the deterrence provided
by firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and thereby securing the
forward deployment of U.S. Forces.
From this perspective, Japan must continue unremittingly with its efforts to
5 ) For example, Katsuhisa Furukawa who recently examined the issue enumerates four conditions for
Japan to make a decision to develop nuclear weapons: a perceived lack of credibility regarding U.S.
extended deterrence; the virtual collapse of international regimes for arms control and nonproliferation;
a significant increase in perceived threat from neighboring countries; and most importantly, the U.S.
Government's approval for Japan to go nuclear. (Katsuhisa Furukawa,りNuclear Option, Arms Control,
and Extended Deterrence: In Search of a New Framework for Japan's Nuclear Policy," Benjamin L. Self
and Jeffrey W. Thompson, (eds.), Japan's Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st
Century, The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003, p. 97.)
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further enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. As a
part of such efforts, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines for
Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, Japan has been continuing with bilateral defense
planning in case of an armed attack against Japan and mutual cooperation
planning in situations in areas surrounding Japan.
In addition, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, based on the Japan-U.S.
Security Treaty, function effectively as a basic framework not only to ensure the
peace and prosperity of Japan and the Far East, but also to realize peace, stability
and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.
According to the National Defense Program Guideline for FY2005 and After, in
order to protect its territory and people against the threat of nuclear weapons,
Japan will continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. This is the same as the
previous National Defense Program Guideline published in 1995. In the preparation
of the new Guideline, the private advisory group to Prime Minister Koizumi
suggested the phrase, ''against the threat of nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction", with the implication of nuclear deterrence against not only
nuclear threat but also the threat by chemical or biological weapons. However, this
suggestion was not adopted.
It is also noticed that after the phrase of nuclear deterrence, the following
sentences appear.
"At the same time, Japan will play an active role in creating a world free of
nuclear weapons by taking realistic step-by-step measures for nuclear disarmament
and non-proliferation. Japan also will play an active role in international
disarmament and non-proliferation efforts regarding other types of weapons of
mass destruction and their delivery means, such as missiles."7
Proponents
A majority of politicians, scholars and the general public support the idea of
nuclear deterrence by the U.S. as a basic security foundation for Japan.
6 ) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook 2005, p. 155.
7 ) Japan Defense Agency, National Defense Program Guideline for Fy惣005 and After,
[http : //www.j da. go.j p/e/policy/f-word/taikou05/eO 1_0 3. htm]
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Opponents
A few experts argue against not only nuclear deterrence by the U.S. but also
the Japan-U.S. alliance itself. They search for a Japan that is completely
independent, in particular, from the U.S. They also argue that Japan should have
its own nuclear weapons for its defense and for its prestige.
On the other hands, some politicians, scholars and citizens criticize the nuclear
deterrence from the other side. They maintain that the theory of nuclear
deterrence would only lead to a nuclear arms race and make the world more
dangerous. The criticism of the theory of nuclear deterrence has been expressed by
mainly liberal scholars who are eager to achieve nuclear elimination as soon as
possible.
Instead of, or in parallel with the U.S.-Japan security treaty, they argue for
some form of East Asia framework to maintain peace and security in this area.
SHOULD JAPAN KEEP PURSUING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT?
The Government's Position
Japan, in order to realize a peaceful and secure world free of nuclear weapons,
considers the strengthening of the international regime for nuclear disarmament
and non-proliferation based on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty very
important.
Japan takes the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) as an
indispensable pillar of the regime for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation,
and urges its early entry into force as one of the most urgent issues of high
priority in the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation field. Japan also
strongly supports the early commencement of the negotiation on a treaty banning
the production of fissile material for weapons purposes (FMCT). Japan is one of
the leading countries to the elaboration and implementation of the Additional
Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, and urges other countries
to sign and ratify it for its universalization.
8 ) On Japan's policy, see Directorate General, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
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Since 1994 Japan has submitted a resolution at the UN General Assembly
annually to realize nuclear disarmament.
On December 8, 2005, a resolution titled 'Renewed determination towards the
total elimination of nuclear weapons," was adopted by the General Assembly with
168　states in favor, two states (the U.S. and India) opposing, and　7　states
abstaining. It reaffirms the importance of compliance with and universality of the
NPT, encourages further steps leading to nuclear disarmament, and m particular
encourages Russia and the U.S. for a further nuclear reduction. It calls for the
reduction of operational status of nuclear weapons and stresses the necessity of a
diminishing role for nuclear weapons. It urges the signing and ratification of. the
CTBT, and emphasizes the importance of immediate commencement of the
negotiation of the FMCT.
Even in the National Defense Program Guideline mentioned above, the
importance of nuclear disarmament is emphasized in connection with the nuclear
deterrence.
Proponents
vast majority of Japanese politicians, scholars and citizens are in favor of
nuclear disarmament, and there is a general consensus in Japanese society that
nuclear disarmament is one of the main pillars for international peace and
security.
As the only victim of nuclear bombings, Japanese are in general very sensitive
regarding nuclear weapons, and the peace movement岳in Japan mainly focus on
this issue.
Opponents - Not Enough
Japanese Government nuclear disarmament policy is criticized by active
participants in peace movements that its demand for nuclear disarmament is too
weak, because the Government emphasizes a practical, progressive and step-by-step
approach to nuclear disarmament starting from the CTBT, FMCT and nuclear
reduction.
Affairs, Japan's Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy, April 2004. A new Japanese version (the
third edition) was published in March 2006.
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The Mayor of Hiroshima City proposes the idea of 2020, that is, to completely
eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2020. Activists in nuclear disarmament also
urge for the total elimination of nuclear weapons as soon as possible, or in
accordance with a time framework.
JAPAN'S FRUSTRATION AT THE U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICIES
U.S. Sole Focus on Non一戸roliteration and Ignorance on Disarmament
The first is that the recent U.S. nuclear weapons policy focuses only on the
aspect of nuclear non-proliferatio誓and no regard is paid to the aspect on nuclear
disarmament. At the 2005 NPT review conference, Japan strongly argued that, "35
years after the NPT's entry into force, we must once again recall: our obligations
under Article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith on disarmament measures;
our commitment to the 1995 decision on Principles and Objectives,'an integral
part of package with the NPT indefinite extension; and the 'unequivocal
undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons,'one of the 13
practical steps agreed upon in the 2000 Final Document,り9)
The United States argued for a discussion focused on non-compliance with non-
proliferation norms while ignoring the issue of nuclear disarmament, stating that
Today, the treaty is facing the most serious challenge in its history due to
instances of noncompliance. Some continue to use the pretext of a peaceful nuclear
program to pursue the goal of developing nuclear weapons. This conference
provides an opportunity for us to demonstrate our resolve in reaffirming our
collective determination that noncompliance with the treaty's core nonproliferation
norms is a clear threat to international peace and security."ll
Japan does not underestimate the importance and necessity to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials, as you find that Japan is one of
the most active core members of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) that
9 ) Statement by H. E. Ambassador Yoshiki Mine, Representative of Japan to the NPT Review Conference
in 2005 at the Plenary Meeting of Main Committee I, 19 May 2005.
10) Statement by Stephan G. Rademaker, United States Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control to
the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT, New York, May 2　2005.
/
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I
was initiated by President Bush and tries to impede the transfer of weapons of
mass destruction. Japan also strongly' supports the UN General Assembly
resolution 1540　that was also initiated by President Bush to prevent the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors.
Japan considers that both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are
indispensable for international peace and security and both should be pursued in
parallel. Japan is working not only for nuclear non-proliferation but also for
nuclear disarmament such as the early entry into force of the CTBT that is
generally perceived as a measure to stop arms race and lead to nuclear
disarmament. However, the U.S. is strenuously opposed to the CTBT.
U.S. Treatment of Non-NPT Parties
The second is that the United States seems now dealing non-NPT parties such
as India, Pakistan and Israel as if they were nuclear-weapon states. A basic
foundation for Japan to accept the NPT has been that there岳hould be no more
nuclear-weapon states other than the five nuclear-weapon states. When Japan
decided to sign and ratify the NPT in the 1970s in spite of strong opposition from
some parts, the basic presumption was that no new nuclear-weapon state should be
recognized.
It means that a state that tries to manufacture or detonate nuclear weapons
must be criticized, punished or isolated by the international community, in
particular, by the five nuclear-weapon states. Moreover, they should not help a
state to develop nuclear weapons.
However, the U.S. lifted its economic sanctions against India and Pakistan that
had been imposed because of their nuclear test explosions in May 1998, just after
the　9/ll in order to get support from Pakistan for the war on terrorism in
Afghanistan.
Furthermore, the India-U.S. Joint Statement on July 18, 2005 that promises U.S.
full-scale civil nuclear cooperation with India means that the U.S. will help in
civilian nuclear field with the state that has developed and manufactured nuclear
weapons in clear confrontation with the international norm of nuclear non-
proliferation. Although India is not a party to the NPT and has no obligation
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under the treaty, the U.S. as a party is under the obligation to treat India as a
non-nuclear-weapon state.
It is said that Japan is the best example of the states that may reconsider the
wisdom of their prior nonproliferation decisions in the light of the new U.S.
posture toward India, because they made explicit the conditionality of their NPT
membership on assurances that the international community would not recognize
any additional nuclear-weapon state.1
CONCLUSION
Views on nuclear weapons m Japan are various as stated above. However, the
Government policy on nuclear weapons is clear. Japan will not have nuclear
weapons, Japan depends on nuclear deterrence by the U.S. and Japan pursues
nuclear disarmament sincerely.
On the first point, there seems to be a general consensus that Japan should not
possess nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future, because it would have an
adverse effect on Japan's security.
On the second point, there seems to be a general consensus that Japan should
depend on nuclear deterrence by the U.S. because it is the best way to maintain
peace and security around Japan in the foreseeable future.
On the third point, there seems to be a general consensus that Japan should
pursue nuclear disarmament aiming at a peaceful and secure world free of nuclear
weapons, because Japan is the only victim of nuclear bombing and there still
exists general consensus on nuclear allergy.
However, the second point and third point may collide in some cases. For
example, when Japan criticized India as it conducted nuclear tests in May 1998,
India counter-criticized Japan that Japan was not entitled to criticize India as
Japan depended on the nuclear umbrella of the U.S.
The resolution of this discrepancy will depend on the international security
environment m the future. We should work for a more peaceful and secure world
ll) William Potter, "India and the New Look of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy," Nonproliferation Review,
Vol. 12, No. 2, July 2005, p. 348.
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in all its aspects including not only promoting disarmament and non-proliferation,
but also strengthening the norms and practices of no-use of force, peaceful
settlement of international disputes, peace-keeping, peace-enforcement, and peace
building.
